Open Access to Legal Scholarship and Copyright Rules: A Law and Technology Perspective by Caso, Roberto
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Open Access to Legal Scholarship and 
Copyright Rules:  
A Law and Technology Perspective 
 
Version 1.0 – April 2009 
 
Roberto Caso 
University of Trento-Faculty of Law 
R. Caso 2 
Open Access to Legal Scholarship and 
Copyright Rules:  
A Law and Technology Perspective 
 
Version 1.0 – April 2009* 
 
Roberto Caso 
University of Trento-Faculty of Law 
 
Abstract. By applying copyright law, contracts, customs and technological 
standards it is possible to achieve two different kinds of control over digital 
information. 
In the first form, control is based on the closeness of  information and it is rigid and 
centralized: see, e.g., the Digital Rights Management systems (DRMs). 
In the second form, control is based on the openness of information and it is 
flexible and decentralized: see, e.g., the GNU General Public License (GPL) and 
the Creative Commons Licenses (CCLs). 
Those two models of control correspond to two opposite trends in scientific 
community.  
On one side, the risk is that a rigid and centralized control (such as the one based 
on DRMs), shaped by market considerations, invades the sector proper of the 
scientific community (which, on the contrary, is traditionally inspired by the logic 
of a flexible and decentralized control, based on customs and informal norms). 
This would strongly undermine the possibilities of access to scientific knowledge 
expressed in a digital format. This risk is prominent in the field of legal 
scholarship, where a vast amount of legal information (also covering the 
information that is, in theory, in public domain) is governed by rigid and 
centralized control.  
On the other side, to counteract such a risk, part of the scientific community is 
promoting the logic of Open Access (mostly based on free licenses such as the 
GNU GPL or the CCLs) to scientific knowledge.  
The Open Access (OA) movement is quickly growing in importance for legal 
scholarship. Nonetheless, the institutional arrangements and the technological 
features of OA to legal scholarship are variegated and pose a vast array of 
problems. 
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1. Introduction 
 
We are confronting with a risk. A rigid and centralized control over digital 
information (such as that based on the Digital Rights Management 
systems), shaped by market considerations, may soon dominate the field of 
the scientific community at large (which, on the contrary, has been 
traditionally inspired by the logic of a flexible and decentralized control, 
based on customs and informal norms). This would strongly undermine the 
possibilities of access to scientific knowledge expressed in digital format. 
This risk is particularly acute in the field of legal scholarship, where a vast 
amount of legal information (also covering information that is, in theory, in 
public domain) is governed through rigid and centralized control. To 
counteract such a risk, part of the scientific community is promoting the 
logic of Open Access (mostly based on free licenses such as the GNU 
General Public License or the Creative Commons Licenses) to scientific 
knowledge.  
Despite the initial delay, the Open Access (OA) movement is quickly 
growing in importance for legal scholarship. Nonetheless, the institutional 
arrangements and the technological features of OA to legal scholarship are 
variegated and pose a vast array of problems.  
To understand the interaction between the law and technology in OA to 
legal scholarship Part 2 of this paper outlines the relationship between 
intellectual property and norms of science, Part 3 illustrates the two 
different kinds of control over digital information achieved by applying 
copyright law, contracts, customs and technological standards, Part 4 
describes closed and OA models to scientific knowledge, Part 5 discusses 
the promises and perils of OA to legal scholarship. Eventually, Part 6 
sketches some conclusions. 
 
2. Intellectual property vs. [and] norms of science 
 
Intellectual property has been shaped mainly by economic interests. In 
particular the ancestors of patents and copyrights emerged as privileges 
granted by the king to the representatives of merchant class, such as 
weavers and printers, to exercise their activity exclusively. The mechanism 
of privilege has then evolved to the exclusive right recognized by the law 
(David, 1993). 
From an economic perspective, the exclusive right is a mechanism which is 
needed to balance the incentive to produce creative information with the 
possibility of accessing the same information. As distinct from material 
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goods, information is a non-rival and non-excludable good (Arrow, 1962). 
Because of non excludability an information market cannot emerge. 
Intellectual property grants to the holder an artificial exclusive right, 
formally warranted by state law, mimicking the mechanism of ownership 
of material goods, thus laying the foundations of a market. The right holder 
can exclusively use the invention or the work, enjoying an advantage over 
competitors. In other words, the exclusive right is a sort of legal monopoly. 
Those enjoying the exclusive right can, indeed, charge a monopolistic 
price, i.e. a price higher than the marginal cost. This constitutes a benefit 
with regard to the incentive to produce information, but also a cost for 
society. The most important bundle of costs depends on the fact that 
anyone who is not willing to pay the monopolistic price will be cut out 
from the use of information protected by the exclusivity. Among these are 
also those who wish to re-elaborate the information in order to produce new 
inventions and works. It is, therefore, necessary that the social costs do not 
outweigh the social benefits. The limits of intellectual property rights are 
aimed at such goal and can consist in time limits (for example the patent for 
invention generally lasts twenty years; the copyright lasts usually for the 
lifetime of the author plus seventy years) and content limits (for example 
the patent for inventions concerns only new ideas; the copyright regards 
only the expressive form of an original work) (Menell and Scotchmer, 
2005). 
Instead, the institutional features of the production of scientific knowledge 
have been mostly shaped by the practices and customs of the community of 
scientists, the so-called Republic of Science (Polanyi, 1962). An 
authoritative trend of the sociology of science has singled out the main 
informal norms governing the production of scientific knowledge: 
“universalism”, “communality”, “disinterestedness” and “organized 
skepticism” (Merton, 1973; Eisenberg, 1987; Rai, 1999; Burk, 2006).  
Universalism means that the truthfulness of the results of the research is not 
bound to the scientist’s (national or institutional) identity.  
Communality implies that the knowledge is the product of collaboration 
among colleagues and, therefore, it must be shared within scientific 
community. All the actual knowledge is built upon past knowledge and it is 
the basis for that of the future (as Isaac Newton said “if I have seen further 
it is by standing on the shoulders of Giants”). 
Disinterestedness requires that scientists aspire to research the truth, not 
their personal interests.  
Organized skepticism expects that scientists’ theories will be submitted to 
the critical evaluation of the community before being accepted. 
These four norms are strengthened from the acknowledgement in terms of 
prestige (and of career progress) by the community. The scientific 
community, indeed, prizes those who make original contributions to  
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knowledge. The emphasis on originality generates the incentive to publish 
the works as soon as possible, trying to avoid being anticipated by others. 
But, after having published the work, the scientist does not have any more 
exclusivity over the knowledge she has produced.  
Even though intellectual property and the norms of science have different 
paths, they also intersect. In the complex historic process that has led from 
the “secret science” to the “open science” (Rossi, 2007; David, 2004), the 
invention of scientific journals by the Royal Society of London in early 
1665 – when Henry Oldenburg created the Philosophical Transactions (or 
Phil Trans) - was probably the first of these intersections. At its beginning, 
the scientific journal was, overall, the “public record of original 
contributions to knowledge […]”. “[T]he Republic of Science claimed the 
right to grant intellectual property to scientific ‘authors’ and Phil Trans was 
its instrument of choice” (Guedon, 2001). Hence, it is paternity (i.e. the 
author’s right) at the center of this scenario, not the commercial aspect (the 
editor’s right) of copyright. In fact, for centuries scientific journals and 
scientific articles were not an editor’s business. 
The landscape changed after the World War II, when supply and demand of 
scientific publications quickly rose. Scientific journals become a 
flourishing business. The rise of the concept of “core journals” has shaped 
the peculiar features of the market for journal publications and has led to 
so-called “serial pricing crisis” (Guedon, 2001). As a recent European 
study pointed out: the market of scientific journals is “an intermediated 
market, where libraries are the key buyers, which leads to lower reader 
price sensitivity. Moreover, it is a market where the best authors want to 
publish in highly-read journals and readers want to read journals which 
publish the best authors. This leads to ‘virtuous circles’ for journals, and to 
associated ‘natural barriers to entry’” (AA. VV., 2006). Moreover, “much 
of scientific activity is publicly funded: the output of research is typically 
not bought by journals but ‘donated’ by publicly-funded researchers” (AA. 
VV., 2006).  
  
3. Digital technologies and access to information: closed models vs. 
open models 
 
What role do digital technologies have in the access to scientific 
knowledge? 
At a superficial glance, digital technologies multiply and speed up the 
possibility of access to scientific knowledge. Therefore, it is possible to 
think that their use within the scientific community has reinforced the trend 
of sharing the results of the research with the public. 
Nonetheless, the picture is much more complex. 
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The information and telecommunication technologies present revolutionary 
features (Pascuzzi, 2006). In the context of this discourse, we can single out 
two of them. 
1) On one hand, it is possible to foreclose information totally (for example, 
by making the open source code of software secret or by encrypting a text 
file), making it understandable only to the machines or, better, making it 
accessible and usable (by a human user) through pre-determined 
modalities, machines or software. For example it is possible to program 
software for reading an e-book in a way which is compatible only with 
specific hardware. 
2) On the other hand, it is possible to transmit information in one language 
understood by the computer (binary code) and in an open format (the so-
called open source code), a format modifiable by those who know the 
programming language. 
Following the scenario depicted so far, two models of production of digital 
information can be sketched (Caso, 2008).  
a) The first model is based on the closeness of information and, therefore, 
on rigid and centralized control. Such a model creates hierarchical forms of 
production and distribution in which the information holders can choose 
where, how, when and who will be able to use information: this is the case 
for Digital Rights Management systems (DRMs), based on technological 
protection measures (TPMs). 
b) The second model is based on the openness of information and, 
therefore, on a flexible and decentralized control. This model generates 
non-hierarchical forms of production and distribution (called “Peer to 
Peer”) where the actors, inspired sometimes by different incentives than 
payment in exchange for services, perform the functions typical of 
producers and consumers in a hybrid way: this is the case, for example, of 
the development of an open source software such as Linux or of the 
drawing of texts such as an on-line encyclopedia, where all the users can 
publish or amend the entries (Wikipedia). 
Applying intellectual property law (patent, copyright, industrial secrets), 
contracts, customs and technological standards it is possible to obtain 
different forms of control over digital information. 
Today, two forms of control are emerging, corresponding to the two 
models of production which have been previously indicated. 
A) In the first form, the control is based on the closeness of information 
and it is rigid and centralized. This kind of control emerges from the market 
of the so-called “proprietary software” and finds its foundations on an 
(initially rudimentary) TPM: keeping the source code secret. The 
acknowledgment of the copyright protection and the diffusion of End User 
License Agreements (EULAs), have reinforced this control on a contractual 
basis. 
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This kind of control gives rise to DRM based on (cryptographic) TPMs 
(Bechtold, 2004; Caso, 2004). The control is extended from the source code 
of the software to any information which can be expressed in binary code 
(not only software, but also text, audio, video, etc.).  
The goal of DRM is, indeed, that the conditions – written in the license - 
for access and use of information must be implemented by software and 
machines designed (on the basis of the standards proper of the DRM 
system) in order to enjoy the same information. 
With regard to the control over information, the main components of the 
DRM systems are: 
- the TPMs based mainly on the digital cryptography, but also on other 
technologies such as digital watermarking and fingerprinting; 
- the metadata that describe restrictions in a language which is 
understandable by the computer: 
- the content; 
- the holder of the content; 
- the user; 
- the rules for enjoying the content (for example if it can be copied, printed, 
distributed, etc., where it can be enjoyed, through which machines it can be 
enjoyed), expressed in languages which are called Rights Expression 
Languages (RELs), such as the eXtensible rights Markup Language 
(XrML), which is one of the standard languages. 
B) The second form of control is based on the openness of information and 
is flexible and decentralized. The first model of such control is represented 
by the GNU General Public License (GPL). These are general contractual 
conditions which, using copyright, are aimed at guaranteeing the right to 
copy (so-called “Copyleft”), modify and distribute software with open 
source code to anyone willing to accept such contractual conditions. 
The mechanism of protection relies on the clause which declares that the 
software subject to the license is protected by copyright and that, at the 
same time, imposes on the users of the GPL to apply the same GPL, if the 
same software, or other derived software is distributed, to subsequent 
licensees. The GNU GPL model has inspired several different types of 
licenses. Among these, the Creative Commons Licenses (CCLs) are one of 
the most successful. Such licenses translate the GNU GPL model, 
successfully implemented in the field of software, to the broader field of all 
digital content and to all inventive works embodied in traditional media, 
such as books (Lessig, 2004).  
 
4. Scientific knowledge: closed access models vs. open access models 
 
The scenario described so far gives rise to the risk that rigid and centralized 
control (such as that based on DRM systems), shaped on market 
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considerations, invades the proper domain of the scientific community 
(which is, on the contrary, motivated by the logic of flexible and 
decentralized control, based on customs and informal norms), decreasing 
the possibility of access to scientific knowledge expressed in a digital 
format. Such a risk depends on many factors. 
- Digitalization, along with other causes – such as the shortening of the 
distance between base and applied research – means that the scientific 
community can perceive knowledge as economic goods tradable on the 
market through intellectual property rights and TPMs (Nelson, 2003; 
David, 2003, Eisenberg, 1987). The phenomenon also concerns institutions 
financed by public funds, such as universities (Monotti and Ricketson, 
2003). 
- The contemporary scientific press is controlled by few private big editors, 
who apply market rules and intellectual property rights to the circulation of 
information concerning scientific knowledge. Despite the fact that digital 
technologies allow huge cuts in the costs of production and distribution of 
information, the price fixed by private editors to get access to digitized 
scientific information seems doomed to increase (Guedon, 2001).  
- Western legal systems tend to strengthen and multiply intellectual 
property rights on digital (information) goods (David, 2003). New goods 
are subject to intellectual property (for example, software and databases); 
single goods can be subjected to many intellectual property rights (for 
example, in some cases software can be subject both to copyright and 
patent; databases in the European Union can be subjected both to copyright 
and to a sui generis right); a plurality of subjects can claim intellectual 
property rights (for example, not only private individuals or enterprises, but 
also research institutes, universities, etc.). Rigid and centralized control, 
such as that implemented on DRMs, is part, therefore, of a picture in which 
intellectual property rights appear to be strengthened. Despite the enormous 
power of control and the many effects that this rigid and centralized control 
has on different legal aspects, western parliaments have created a discipline 
of legitimization and protection (only) for some of the components of the 
DRM systems, often by making room for DRM provisions in general 
copyright legislation (see the U.S. Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(DMCA) of 1998 and European Union Copyright Directive (EUCD) of 
2001). Lobbying by traditional (the entertainment industry) and emerging 
(the DRM industry) interests has prevailed on the public interest to regulate 
the control over digital information.  
- Intellectual property legislation on digital goods vary according to the 
legal system considered. For example, the US legal framework is different 
from that of the EU, but also within EU one can detect important 
differences between countries. This is a further hurdle to access to and 
circulation of scientific knowledge expressed in digital form.  
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To counteract this risk, part of the scientific community is promoting the 
logic of OA to scientific knowledge (Willinsky, 2006; Suber, 2004-2006; 
Guedon, 2001). 
Many scientific communities publish their results on websites freely 
accessible to anyone through the Internet. This can be the case for the 
publication of drafts, articles already published in “for payment” journals 
or, again, it may be the sole manner of publishing the research (Guedon, 
2004).  
The logic of OA is also promoted in solemn declarations, such as the Berlin 
Declaration on Open Access to Knowledge in the Sciences and Humanities 
in 2003.  
Nonetheless, the institutional arrangements and the technological features 
of OA are variegated and pose an array of problems (Burk, 2006). 
For example, sharing the source code of software contemplated by the 
GNU GPL is based on contract and informal norms of the community of 
software programmers. On one hand, respect for the GPL is warranted by 
the threat to apply the law of contracts. This seems to be a different aspect 
than that of the traditional informal norms of the scientific community. On 
the other hand, respect is warranted by the reputation created by the norms 
of the software programmers. But this does not mean that such norms can 
be adapted to other communities (such as the communities of the biologists 
or lawyers).  
To make a further example, the CCLs project is developing a program 
specifically dedicated to scientific knowledge called “Science Commons”. 
However, the transplant of the CCLs logic in the scientific context gives 
rise to many questions.  
CCLs are very recent tools, while the institutional arrangements of the 
scientific community are quite old. The CCLs are contracts which can be 
used for all the typologies of authors. The scientific community is formed 
by many scientific communities. Each of them has, along with the general 
informal norms already mentioned in Part 2 of this paper, specific informal 
norms. Moreover, the CCLs raises, like all standard contracts, the problem 
of the licensee’s protection. In particular, an extremely interesting field of 
investigation is that aimed at improving the cognitive and informational 
position of the licensee, making it possible for him to choose preferred 
contractual arrangements with increased awareness (Hillman and 
Rachlinski, 2001). Such a perspective requires a major investigation also on 
the programming side, particularly with regard at the aim of improving the 
technologies for the digital management of the contracts (Mulligan and 
Burstein 2003). 
 
5. Open Access to legal scholarship: promises and perils 
 
R. Caso 10 
The risk of rigid and centralized control based on market considerations 
invading the proper domain of the scientific community is acute if one 
considers the field of legal scholarship. A vast amount of legal information 
- also covering information that is, in theory, in the public domain - is 
presently accessible only through closed and proprietary databases such as 
Lexis and Westlaw. The increasing concentration of the market of legal 
databases has led to escalating prices for legal information (Arewa, 2006). 
The contractual and market power of databases holders is strengthened by 
new copyright laws (such as the EU directive 96/9 on the database 
protection and the DMCA as well as the EUCD on TPMs). 
But, despite the initial delay, the OA movement is quickly growing in legal 
scholarship (Carroll, 2006; Hunter, 2006; Solum, 2007). 
The OA model to legal scholarship has the potential to subvert the present 
dominant publishing model. Perhaps this is true as well as in other 
scientific fields. This impression depends on the peculiar features of the 
legal field. 
- The peer review system (traditionally managed by commercial 
editors) is much less important in law than in the hard sciences. 
- Some types of legal publications are for non academic lawyers 
(judges, attorneys, etc.). Besides, legal scholarship is more and 
more interdisciplinary and globalized (Carroll, 2006). Hence, the 
public interested in legal publications is very large and 
heterogeneous. 
- The raw legal data (i.e., the primary sources like acts and judicial 
opinions) are – thanks to clear copyright rules - in many western 
legal systems in the public domain. 
The emerging OA model the legal scholarship has the following 
institutional structure. 
- The major functions of publications (selecting the best works, 
making the works accessible, publicizing the works, and archiving 
the works) is based on the old participants (commercial editors, 
university press, law reviews student-edited, etc.) and new 
intermediaries (legal scholarship repositories like Social Science 
Research Network’s Legal Scholarship Network and Berkeley 
Electronic Press Legal Repository, Wikipedia, Internet search 
engines like Google Books and Google Scholar, social software, 
etc.) (Solum, 2007).  
- Production costs are – as in the past – borne by the authors and 
their institutions (universities and law faculties). Dissemination 
costs – lower than in the past - are shared among the authors, their 
institutions and the old and new intermediaries. The incentive 
system is based on the “reader’s attention”. E.g., in the publishing 
of a post-print on the OA repository such as SSRN, the authors and 
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law reviews increase the probability of reading and citation, while 
the repository multiplies the circulation of its own brand, and the 
Internet search engines increases the number of users and visits. 
Moreover, OA dramatically reduces the delay in publication 
(making the information more useful to potential readers, if it is 
true that time is an important variable in the contemporary legal 
arena, especially for attorneys and for judges) and the costs of 
reading/accessing that material. 
- The author retains copyright (in particular, the right of attribution) 
over the publication and grants - through open licenses such as 
CCLs (see the Open Access Law Program of the Science 
Commons Project) (Carroll, 2006) – to public and intermediaries a 
limited set of rights.  
This is a revolutionary approach. OA to legal scholarship changes the form 
of the legal publication - as a scholar has pointed out, we are facing new 
kind of publications such as the “idea-paper”, the blog post, the Wikipedia 
article (Solum, 2007) - and shifts the “quality selection” function from the 
traditional intermediaries to the new intermediaries (e.g. search engines and 
social software) and the readers. 
Nonetheless, the revolution has just started, and we are in the middle of it. 
The future of OA to legal scholarship is not clear. Some scholars have 
argued that the OA movement complements the old publishing model and 
is not a substitute. In particular, an author has pointed out that the success 
of the OA depends on the power to supply the so called “economy of 
prestige” that has been managed for centuries by legal scholarship through 
the old publishing model (Madison, 2006).  
If it is true that the managing the economy of prestige is still (and will be) a 
cornerstone of (legal) scholarship, nevertheless the revolutionary power of 
digital technologies is modifying the features not only of the publishing 
model but also of the academic lawyer itself. As argued above, thanks to 
information and communication technologies, legal scholarship is more and 
more interdisciplinary and globalized. 
Rather, the actual problems of the OA to legal scholarship seem the same 
as those of the larger OA movement. These problems can be synthesized in 
the following list. 
- Until now OA has been a bottom up and decentralized movement, 
based on different policies, solemn declarations and contractual 
arrangements such as CCLs. In fact, there is no unified definition 
of OA. Yet, the formal law shows a growing attention to OA (see, 
in the USA, the National Institute of Health Public Access Policy 
implements the Division G, Title II, Section 218 of PL 110-161, 
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008). Hence, the future of OA 
depends on the intersection between formal law, OA policies and 
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social norms of science. E.g., the CCLs are formal contracts (even 
if contracts with special features) and customs of (legal) science are 
informal norms. The future will tell us if the application of CCLs in 
the courts will be compatible with social norms of (legal) science. 
- OA is a powerful instrument making work accessible. The success 
of the OA in the other three functions of publishing (selecting the 
best works, publicizing the work, and archiving the work) will 
depend not only on institutional arrangements but also on the 
development of a trustworthy technological system based on 
standardization of metadata (Carroll, 2006; Madison, 2006), search 
engines with sophisticated Boolean operators, and digital formats 
which guarantee long term preservation of the works. From this 
perspective the openness of software and formats will play a 
fundamental role. 
- OA is not Nirvana. The dislocation of publishing functions to new 
intermediaries raises a number of new risks. E.g., Google’s 
algorithm is not neutral. “Google ranks the relevance of any given 
Web site by determining the number of other sites that are linked to 
it” (Hunter, 2006). This is a value choice. Moreover, “the precise 
method for producing the rank order is a trade secret” (Solum, 
2007). Last but not least, many have raised concerns about the 
Google’s power to process an infinitive quantity of personal data 
(Guarda, 2009). In other words, dislocating publishing functions 
means also dislocating power, with new problems related to that 
power.  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
OA is an extremely powerful tool for the dissemination of knowledge made 
possible by digital technologies. It has some real advantages as regards the 
traditional publishing model. Moreover, through OA it is possible to 
counteract the risk that the rigid and centralized control (such as that based 
on the DRM systems), shaped on market considerations, will invade the 
proper domain of the scientific community. But the definitive success of 
OA (in legal scholarship as well as in other scientific fields) depends on our 
capacity to understand and manage the complex intersection among 
intellectual property law, contracts, norms of science and technological 
standards. 
One may say that the OA is the revenge of “author’s right” on the “editor’s 
right”. Nevertheless we must be conscious that - in the digital age - 
copyright law is only one (and not the most important) among many other 
instruments which may govern the production and distribution of 
information. 
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The dislocation of the publishing functions to new intermediaries raises a 
number of new risks. To counteract these new risks we have to take 
Internet governance seriously and to see beyond copyright law. 
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